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the occasion. They are solemnized by a sense of the obligations, the important trusts, and numerous duties connected with it. That you may be enabled to discharge them with honor to yourself, with justice and impartiality to your country, and with satisfaction to this great people, shall be the daily prayer of your

A. A."*

— pp. 428, 429.

We are not satisfied with this volume. We are not satisfied, because it gives us a sharp appetite for more of the same kind. As a picture of past times, as an exhibition of an extraordinary character, as a contribution to the public history of the country, it has great attraction and value. We trust that the Editor will not fail to increase his claims upon the gratitude of the readers of this selection, by greatly extending it in a future edition.

ART. VI. — *Theory of Legislation* ; by JEREMY BENTHAM. Translated from the French of ETIENNE DUMONT, by R. HILDRETH, Author of "Banks, Banking, and Paper Currencies," "Despotism in America," "Archy Moore," &c. Boston : Weeks, Jordan, & Co. 1840. In Two Volumes. 12mo.

MR. DUMONT's office in respect to Jeremy Bentham's fragments, was the same as that of the comparative anatomists in respect to extinct species of animals, who, digging

* We are tempted to record an anecdote, which, besides being related on good authority, has a verisimilitude which vouches for its truth.

It was natural, that those who were acquainted with Mrs. Adams's extraordinary intelligence, and the profound interest which she took in public affairs, should exaggerate the influence exerted by her over her husband's mind. At the time when Mr. Adams displeased his cabinet by sending the special mission to France, an anonymous writer in one of the Boston newspapers accounted for the error by saying that "the old lady was not with him." The piece was written by a distinguished friend of Hamilton and Pickering, and Mrs. Adams had intelligence respecting its authorship. It so chanced, that not long afterward she dined with the President at the table of this gentleman, who supposed his *incognito* to be preserved. The conversation turned upon some more recent measure of the President, which the host and his friends spoke of with strong commendation. At the first pause Mrs. Adams turned to him, and with a look of arch good nature which few eyes ever could express like hers, said, "The old lady was not with him then."

into the earth, the great magazine of animal *exuviae* and *débris*, and finding a tooth or a claw, a shell or a bone, here and there, construct therefrom the entire skeleton, and clothe it with flesh and a skin, and give, in due systematic order, the genera and species that have been extinct some thousands of years. So M. Dumont has ransacked the inexhaustible magazine of Bentham's fragments, and brought together the scattered parts, as it seemed to him, of systems of ethics and legislation, in which, however, he has himself supplied many deficiencies. Mr. Bowring, as executor to Mr. Bentham, has succeeded M. Dumont in the business of giving symmetry to the specimens of his testator; but his task is more arduous, for, instead of having finished and half-finished parts to piece out and fit together, he has little more than mere outlines, rudiments, and hints, of which he is to make entire systems, such as Bentham might perhaps have constructed if he had lived long enough.

The mass of works thus produced by M. Dumont by translating Bentham's manuscripts, and filling up the gaps, and adding something by way of ornament and illustration, has had an immense circulation on the continent of Europe. The effect of such speculations as those of Bentham, working in the minds of the busy political philosophers, must doubtless have been very considerable. The force of his ethical writings is almost spent; the principle of utility as the sole foundation and criterion of morals is about passing into the limbo of vanities. The effect, while it was in vogue, was no doubt beneficial in fixing the attention of mankind more steadily on utility as a landmark and guide to moral sentiments and philanthropy; but, on the other hand, it was injurious in making men overlook and forget the intuitive moral perceptions, and the spontaneous instinctive promptings and aspirations of the human mind, as being the basis and revealed principle of systems of ethics. The utility theory teaches us, that we learn the distinction of right and wrong, and virtue and vice, as we do geometry, whereas it is born with us, like hunger and thirst; and as there is a vast deal of art and science involved in the gratification of the appetites, so there is in giving direction and scope to the sentiment of goodness; but we must start with the *postulatum* of the sentiment, the innate feeling of right, and of the obligation of right, as an ultimate fact, the existence and verity

of which cannot be proved, any more than that of taste and smell, being a mere matter of individual experience. Moral sentiment and obligation being conceded, it is then easy to perceive a difference between a good man and a useful machine. We must inquire what is most useful, and pursue it, say the utilitarians. Why? what is the obligation? This question they do not answer. They do not point out the distinction, in ethics, between the useful machine and the useful man who works it. The word *duty* seems to have no meaning in their philosophy.

Mr. Bentham's political speculations are also not without theoretical distortions; but he is not very Utopian, he does not write of perfect commonwealths, founded upon a state of manners, morals, and intelligence of rights and obligations, that have been out of vogue ever since the golden age. He takes mankind as he finds them, with their passions, views, depravity, and blind prejudices; and sometimes reminds his readers of Solon's modification of theories and principles, by the rule, that you are only to give a people as good a code as they will bear. Still he keeps the political *beau idéal* in view, as the central point which legislation is always to seek, but from which it is always driven off by the centrifugal perversity and inaptitude of men, or the untowardness of circumstances. He is a downright, sturdy, hardworking man, of great power and no grace, and utterly free from all offences of the imagination; but he is frequently commonplace and utterly sterile, with, at the same time, great parade of science and analysis, making formal divisions in due order of first, second, and so on, in so long a series that the reader often can hardly but forget where he began, long before he comes to the end. And then he has a way, in the beginning of his chapters and sections, of using a word in a singular and often in an uncouth sense, and then solemnly defining it, with the oracular air, all the while, of revealing momentous truths; whereas the whole of this analytical pageant is only an awkward shift to disguise the want of clear and precise thinking, and mastery of language. After faring on a tiresome length in some of these sandy tracts, the reader is ready to faint and give up the pursuit, but by and by, all by surprise, he finds himself on a firmer footing, in the midst of rich products. And from time to time he is recreated by a chivalrous emprise of the stout old knight, in battering down the moss grown fortress

of some venerable prejudice ; opening to the day the lurking-place of some monstrous error ; or piercing, by his sarcasm, some empty form of conventional mummery. He becomes, all of a sudden, original, strong, fervent, and poignant. The greatest merit of Bentham's writings lies in his occasional heats and intellectual paroxysms, where he does not indulge in his cynical skepticism. It is hard and tiresome to read through his works, or rather the tomes that come out in his name, so much of which consists of mere rude masses ; but then, again, one would not willingly forego his masterly passages. It would be a great service to the science of legislation and of ethics, and to his own memory, to collect his good things. A volume or two of excerpts might be made from his works, which posterity would gladly take along with them.

Bentham begins the present treatise on the "Theory of Legislation," by announcing with much solemnity, that he is the partisan and standard-bearer of utility. "The public good ought to be the object of the legislator ; GENERAL UTILITY ought to be the foundation of his reasonings." And what is utility ? It is "the fixed point to which the first link of a chain is attached" ; it is the beginning, the end, and the middle of his system, the alpha, the omega, and all the rest of his political alphabet. It is the talisman that charms away all ill, and attracts all good. There is no end of his eulogies of utility. Its sovereign virtues surpass those of all quack medicines, and he speaks of it as the advertisers and venders of these same do of their elixirs and balsams, as something of his own discovery, to which, by his manner of speaking, you would suppose him to be entitled to a patent right. He tells us, "Utility is an abstract term. It expresses the property or tendency of a thing to prevent some evil, or to procure some good." This is utility. We understand it quite well if we know what *evil* and *good* are, but, lest we should not, he defines these also. "*Evil*," he says, "is pain, or the cause of pain ; *good* is pleasure, or the cause of pleasure. *Moral good* is good only by its tendency to produce physical good. *Moral evil* is evil only by its tendency to produce physical evil ; but, when I say *physical*, I mean the pains and pleasures of the soul, as well as the pains and pleasures of sense." So we understand what utility is. We are at the same time instructed that to give to

this principle all its efficacy, three conditions are necessary ; 1. "To attach clear and precise ideas to the word utility ;" 2. "To establish the unity and sovereignty of this principle ;" 3. "To find the processes of a moral arithmetic by which uniform results may be arrived at." The first condition is complied with, the meaning of utility is understood ; the second may be conceded, viz. its unity (whatever this may mean) and sovereignty ; the third is not so easy ; these "processes of moral arithmetic, by which uniform results may be arrived at," are not readily discovered. Mr. Bentham beats about for them in vain, leading his readers into darkness and perplexity, beclouded with misty phraseology and definitions upon definitions, and divisions and distinctions infinite, but no light, no consequences, no "uniform results," only a vast vacuity of jargon and charlatanry. Perhaps there was more meaning and wisdom in this scientific parade and solemn marshalling of forces, thirty years ago, when this treatise was originally written ; but, at this day, it certainly appears to be mere mummery, the "uniform result" of which, to the reader, is, that Mr. Bentham cannot think and express himself with scientific simplicity, and clearness, and precision. He mistakes obscurity for profoundness. It is this scientific parade without definite meaning, or meaning worth expression, that renders him so insupportably tedious ; insomuch that his most docile and confiding disciple, most happily endowed with patience and long-suffering fortitude, cannot choose but give over, and pass by the scientific flummery, and choose out the passages where he talks with plain straightforwardness upon a practical, interesting question, where he heaves out masses of sense, with frequent felicity of phrase, illustration, and historical and classical references, though often with too bitter antipathy to creeds and hierarchies.

Take any one of the topics treated of in these volumes upon legislation, as for instance, whether a man who has with his own labor raised a crop of wheat, and stored it, shall, on his being overtaken by a fatal disease in the autumn, have the right by law to leave it to his family, for their support after his decease, or shall leave it to be confiscated by the public, and his family to go to the alms-house. This is the topic of one of the chapters, which is treated very well ; and the conclusion is, that the law, which gives the bread to the chil-

dren, is the better one. Here is a question, readily understood by everybody ; and all that can be said upon it, expressed in common English words, used in their ordinary acceptation, is level to the comprehension of any reader of ordinary intelligence. What possible assistance can be derived to the discussion, from the "unity and supremacy" of utility, and the "moral arithmetic," and the definitions and axioms and vague generalities, with which the reader has been afflicted through one half or two thirds of the preceding parts of the treatise ? Mr. Bentham would say, that he conducted the whole discussion, and came to his conclusion, upon the consideration of the greater utility, that is, the greater aggregate of good or pleasure, as he has it, or the greater alleviation or prevention of evil or pain, arising from one or the other law ; just as if he were the first philosophico-political writer, who has treated the question in this manner. This is really a notable instance of self-conceit, for he seems honestly to suppose, that he has made utility better understood, by saying, that it involves the comparison of good and evil, and pleasure and pain ; and that mental pain is physical pain, which last is mere nonsense. It is plain, that after reading all this analysis and speculation, which occupy much space in all Mr. Bentham's philosophical writings, we have no more knowledge of pleasure and pain, and good and evil, and utility, than we began with ; and it is only the author's own overweening self-esteem, that can make him imagine that he has enlightened us.

From the time when the first man first breathed, down to this present, all mankind have been in active quest of this same utility, of good, pleasure, ease, content ; and the same motive has influenced them in legislation as well as in war, hunting, agriculture, commerce, and the arts. To enjoin this motive on men, is as superfluous as to exhort them not to expose themselves to fire and frost.

The introduction of the doctrine of materialism into the definition and estimate of good and evil, and defining mental enjoyments and sufferings to be merely physical, does not strengthen this motive, nor throw the slightest light upon its operation. The difficulty is, to discriminate good and ill, the useful and the harmful ; and a still greater difficulty, to reinforce and give predominance to the motives for pursuing the one, and eschewing the other.

Mr. Bentham has done something in the great and still beginning and never ending labor of demonstrating what is pernicious, and he sometimes points out the proper alternative, the useful. In this search, he is not, however, always successful; and still less is he in the work of reinforcing and multiplying the motives to the right in preference to the wrong. This, indeed, he rarely undertakes at all. And the effect of his exertions is all the less, by reason of his uncouth, empirical phraseology, affectation of profoundness, and other impediments already mentioned.

Mr. Hildreth remarks, in his Preface to this translation,

“Public attention in America is every day more and more attracted to the subject of Legal Reform; and the translator flatters himself that he will have performed a useful and acceptable service, in restoring to its native English tongue, the following treatise.

“It includes a vast field, never before surveyed upon any regular plan, and least of all according to such principles as Bentham has laid down. In the application of those principles, he has doubtless made some mistakes; for mistakes are of necessity incident to a first attempt. But he has himself furnished us with the means of detecting those mistakes and of correcting them. He asks us to receive nothing on his mere authority. He subjects every thing to the test of *General Utility*.” — p. viii.

From his speaking of *restoring* the treatise to its native English tongue, we infer that he was not aware that the same treatise, or something substantially the same, and bearing the same title, was published in English some ten years ago by Mr. John Neal.

It is very true, that the treatise “includes a vast field,” but the assertion that it has never before been surveyed upon a regular plan, must be limited to the qualification of “regular plan,” at least, if not to that of its not having been surveyed “upon the same principles”; for at the date of the composition, and long before, the continent of Europe teemed with similar speculations.

In 1830 the writings and character of Bentham came under the animadversion of the author of some ably written letters, under the signature of *Eunomus*, addressed to Sir Robert Peel, on the occasion of the discussions respecting the

revision and consolidation of the English statutes on various titles. He says of Mr. Bentham,

“ Taking advantage of the peculiar condition of ignorance, in which the English alone among modern nations exist, of the real truths of judicial and jurisprudential science, one of the most singular, and, in some respects, the most talented writers of the day conceived the design, which he has at length, to a very considerable extent, achieved, of founding an individual fame upon the means which his prolific and scorching pen conferred upon him of abusing that ignorance. The circumstances of this case, Sir, in all points of view, place it among the most curious incidents of modern literature. A future generation, fully informed by intermediate discussion in the principles of jurisprudential economy, will review it with an interest, and perhaps with an indignation, which we can scarcely yet realize. They will say, — *This writer* was not one of those who could justly shelter himself under the general ignorance which then prevailed of the principles of jurisprudence, or of the practical results of the tests to which those principles had been submitting on the continent of Europe for a long series of years. He was a man to whom neither the languages nor the literature of the continent were unfamiliar ; he was a man who contrasted, by a long life of uninterrupted literary leisure, those engrossing pursuits of routine which excluded almost all other men from investigations which did not immediately belong to the business of established departments. He was a *citizen of the world*, in a degree which did not ordinarily belong to Englishmen. He was a citizen of France by a decree of the National Assembly, — he was a member of the French Institute, — he spent several years of his life upon the continent, — his personal connexions were principally continental, — and his name was of sufficient occurrence both in French, in German, in Russian, and in Polish literature, to compel a person of his very acute sensibility to fame and notoriety to keep a frequent eye to the journals and literature of the continent. All these circumstances, they will say, appertained to that individual ; and, despite of them all, he either shut his eyes to that which he might have learnt from those peculiar sources of information, or he trusted to their remaining enshrouded in that obscurity which had hitherto been interposed between them and the English nation. For a long course of years, he continued, unweariedly, to inoculate the public mind with a series of mendacious and ignorant assertions and theories, in regard to their existing jurisprudence, and the causes of its defects, one and all of which would have been dispelled, and scattered

to the winds, by only a moderate acquaintance with the experience and the wisdom of that continent with which he was, or might be, so familiar. The doctrine which he most strenuously accumulated his efforts to disciple the English nation to, was, that all the faults, all the abominations of their jurisprudence, arose from law having been made by judges instead of by legislators ; — that it was the business of judges only to *pronounce* the law which legislatures concocted ; — that a text-law might and should be framed, in which, ‘ saving the necessary allowance for human weakness,’ ‘ no case that could present itself should find itself unnoticed or unprovided for.’ He *did not tell them* that seventy years before, a man who, like himself, ‘ had just and profound views on all sorts of subjects,’* — FREDERIC THE GREAT, — had made the same discovery of the cause of the ill condition of the law ; that he not only *projected* but *executed* the same remedy ; — that with the same antipathy to judge-made law, and belief in the all-sufficiency of legislator-made law, the express directions of the King were that the Code might be simple, popular, and so complete, *that the judge might find in a precise text of law the decision of each individual case* ; and that he *prohibited all analogical interpretation of the rules it contained by the judges*, and ordained that, in every case for which the code did not provide, application should be made to the legislative authority. He *did not tell them* that the absurdity of the project, though backed with all the *éclat* of the *great monarch’s* reign, terminated its existence in less than thirty years ; and that the first step that accompanied the publication of the *new* code was the restoration of the right of interpreting the laws to the judges. He *did not tell them* that the talented jurists who composed the *projet* of the Code Napoléon had, in their *Discours préliminaire*, exposed, in the most eloquent and profound manner, the vulgar absurdity of supposing ‘ that a body of laws could be framed which would provide for all possible cases, and at the same time be understood by the lowest citizen ; ’ and had boldly declared that the *details* of law ‘ must necessarily be abandoned to the empire of usage, to the discussions of the learned, and to the decision of the judges.’ He *did not tell them* that the most talented, experienced, and philosophical jurists of Germany, of Holland, of Belgium, of Italy, of Switzerland, of Russia, had been engaged almost unceasingly in some or other of those countries for half a century, in

* “ This was Frederic’s own description of himself, in his *Plan pour réformer la Justice*. ‘ Ce prince, qui a des vues justes et profondes sur toute sorte de sujets,’ &c.”

the construction, discussion, and re-construction of CODES ; that one of the greatest difficulties they had had to encounter had been to draw the line between the respective functions of LEGISLATION on the one hand, and JUDICIAL JURISPRUDENCE on the other ; and that, in the result of all that discussion and experience, *those* codes had ultimately fallen into most disesteem which attempted most to supplant the functions of the judge, and to anticipate the details of *application*. Availing himself of a distinction which had originated in the laws of ancient Rome, centuries before the introduction of printing, and which had been absurdly enough continued by habit to the present time, — the now nominal distinction of *written* and *unwritten* law, — he represented to the community in the most mendacious terms, that the common law of the country was *unwritten*, and therefore *unknown* and *uncognoscible* law. He *did not tell them* that that *unwritten common law* was PRINTED four times as often in every year, — and in four times the number, — of the printed copies of the *written* or statute law. He argued upon *that unwritten* common law of which three thousand printed copies were distributed annually over the British Empire, as if it had been the same thing as the common law of Russia before the time of the Empress Catherine, which existed only in the Ukases of the judges ; Ukases which were accessible and known only to those few persons who in that country corresponded to counsel or advocates in Britain, and to which persons they *were* accessible and known, only by the circumstance of their having been judges' servants, or having had other such private opportunities of learning the forms of courts, and of being acquainted with precedents and Ukases.

“Taking advantage of the same ignorance, he put forth claims to be the first of created excellences, who had conceived and had carried into execution, the project, which he represented as hitherto unknown and unattempted, of promulgating *the reason* along with each rule of law ; — that reason which should be at once the sanction and the commentary. He *did not tell them* that the very distinction which constituted the superior excellence of the unwritten or common over the written or statute law, — the very ground on which its preference was awarded to it by professors, — was that the common or judge-made law existed, and existed alone, in the shape of a series of *rules deduced from reason* ; that the rule was, with certain anomalous exceptions, never to be found unaccompanied by the reason ; that it was often to be deduced *only* from the reasoning itself, the subject-matter of law being often too subtle and too complicated to admit of the very *form* of propo-

sition. He *did not tell them* that that body of written or promulgated law which had obtained so great a celebrity under the title of the CODE NAPOLÉON, though unaccompanied, in its official and portable shape, by the *motifs* of the compilers, was scarcely ever consulted by the jurisconsults of those countries where it was received without the accompaniment of those motives, either in the same or in a separate volume. He *did not tell them* that those '*motifs*' and the '*discussion*' constituted, practically, a part of the French legislation. He *did not tell them* that under the title of '*La législation civile, commerciale, et criminelle de la France,*' the text of the five codes, that text of which the brevity has so much been admired, was then in a course of publication in twenty-four thick octavo volumes, the product of the additions to that text of the *motifs*, the *discussion*, and the suppletory laws ; — that publication emanating from the chief Secretary of the *Conseil d'État*, compiled from the official documents, and being therefore, in every substantial sense, itself official.

"All these things he either himself refused to notice, although going on under his eye, and within the immediate range of those vibrations which converged into the literary hermitage of Queen Square Place ; and although he visited Paris personally so lately as 1825, was received with honors by the French advocates, and promised them to write a work upon the legislation and jurisprudence of France ; — or, if he did notice them, he trusted to chance, and to the well-known Confucian ignorance of his countrymen, for a season of undetection sufficiently extended for all the calculable purposes of his own fame."

But at the same time, another English writer on jurisprudence, Mr. E. Sinclair Cullen, gave a very exalted character of Mr. Bentham. He says ;

"When I read the criticisms of those who

'Bounded by nature, narrowed still by art,
A trifling head, and a contracted heart,'

attack the opinions and deride the style of Mr. Bentham, I am the more struck with his stupendous superiority of mind, and his enviable superiority of feeling. Men of ordinary capacities fancy there cannot be any great wisdom beyond their own narrow ken, — that there can be no altitudes above their reach, — no depths which they cannot fathom, — no world which they cannot hold in their dirty little hands. Such men are yet more shrunken in their capacities by the worldly interests and feelings which continually absorb and degrade their

contemplations and faculties. The venerable Bentham has preserved the purity of his soul and the lucidness of his judgment by a hermit life, — having early withdrawn himself from the sully and corrupting assaults and seductions of that self-interest which a worldly life presents to other men at every turn and at every moment ; and, emancipated from their power and exempted from their taint, has calmly and almost superhumanly contemplated and judged the motives, and duties, and powers of men, — dwelling with peace, and wisdom, and virtue, in the shrine of his renowned and noble seclusion. But I let my pen drop with humility ; — suddenly ashamed at my presumption in fancying that I can offer any worthy homage to a person so celebrated in all quarters of the world as a benefactor to mankind.”

So opposite are the opinions entertained of Jeremy Bentham and his labors.

The circulation of this translation, or any work on the same subject in the United States, will have a good effect as far as it may have any influence to invoke attention to the science of legislation, a science which has come to be much more studied, and better understood, on the continent of Europe, than in either England or this country. It is now but a short time, since the introduction of a code of laws was with us considered to be nothing less than a revolution. The United States, and the several States, had their statute books, which they were constantly enlarging, and never a year passed without some material change in the laws. And yet a code, which is nothing more than a systematic arrangement of the laws, supplying chasms and changing such as appear to be defective, was considered to be some terrific innovation. Of late, however, this horror has subsided, and the construction of a code, most usually under the name of *revised statutes*, is quite a usual occurrence. It is true, that formerly some of the speculative philosophers were too fiercely bent upon upturning the whole mass of laws, and introducing many new ones, as foreign to the habits, and business, and wants of the times, as many of the old ones necessarily had become by changes in the social and economical condition. Men thought it better to “bear the ills they had, than fly to others that they knew not of.” But the alarm has passed, and men are not now afraid to arrange under appropriate heads, the laws they have, and to supply obvious defects, and to change what is palpably wrong, by the revision of the laws from

time to time, whenever the statute book has grown to be of unwieldy bulk, and the law has become perplexed by detached and piecemeal legislation. The science of legislation is, therefore, an eminently practical one with us ; in other words, we do a vast deal of legislation, and shall continue to do a vast deal as long as the course of things continues to be onward instead of becoming backward ; and this activity in law-making cannot be repressed, notwithstanding that some of our grave and respected seniors may shake their heads ominously. The tides are moving, the winds are blowing, and the sails are spread, and the ship's company will not be induced by ever so loud warnings to come to anchor. If then an inactive, stationary security is wholly out of the question, as it undoubtedly is, we must seek safety in skill and science, in the pursuit of which a glorious career is opened to both ambition and philanthropy ; to ambition, for it is most honorable to point out the way of improving the laws ; to philanthropy, for in no pursuit can greater service be rendered to society.

ART. VII. — *Antiquités Mexicaines. Relation des Trois Expéditions du Capitaine Dupaix, ordonnées en 1805, 1806, 1807, pour la Recherche des Antiquités du Pays, notamment celles de Mitla et de Palenque ; accompagnée des Dessins de CASTANEDA, Membre des Trois Expéditions, et Dessinateur du Musée de Mexico, et d'une Carte du Pays exploré : suivie d'une Parallèle de ces Monuments avec ceux de l'Egypte, de l'Indostan, et du Reste de l'Ancien Monde*, par M. ALEXANDRE LENOIR, Créateur du Musée des Monuments Français, Membre de la Société Royale des Antiquaires de France, de celle de Londres, &c. ; *d'une Dissertation sur l'Origine de l'Ancienne Population des deux Amériques, et sur les diverses Antiquités de ce Continent*, par M. WARDEN, Ancien Consul-Général des Etats-Unis, Correspondant de l'Institut de France, Membre de la Société Royale des Antiquaires de France, et de plusieurs autres Sociétés Savantes : *avec un Discours Préliminaire*, par M. CHARLES FARCY, de la Société Royale des Antiquaires de France, et de la Société libre des Beaux-Arts de Paris ; *et des Notes*